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FINANCIALISATION AND THE PORTUGUESE REAL INVESTMENT: 
A SUPPORTIVE OR DISRUPTIVE RELATIONSHIP? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between financialisation and 
real investment by Portuguese non-financial corporations from 1979 to 2013. In theory, while 
financialisation leads to a rise in financial investments by non-financial corporations and thus 
deviates funds from real investment, it also intensifies the pressure for financial payments and 
therefore restricts the funds available for real investment. We estimate an aggregate investment 
function including control variables (profitability, debt, cost of capital and output growth) and 
two measures of financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments). The paper 
concludes that there is a long-term investment equation, and finds evidence that the process of 
financialisation has hampered real investment largely as a result of financial payments. The 
paper also identifies that profitability and debt are both detrimental to real investment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Mainstream economics advocates that the financial sector plays a crucial role in 
boosting real investment of non-financial corporations due to the relationship between savings 
and investments (e.g. Levine, 2005). Nonetheless, the literature on financialisation (Orhangazi, 
2008a and 2008b; Hein and van Treeck, 2010; Hein, 2012; Hein and Dodig, 2015; among 
others) stresses that the development of finance impairs real investment, notably through two 
channels. Firstly, non-financial corporations are more engaged in financial activities due to the 
incentives and pressures to generate short-term profits, which diverts funds from productive 
activities (“crowding out” effect). Secondly, financial markets increasingly require payments to 
be made by non-financial corporations, thus using up funds that could have been assigned to 
long-term productive projects. 
In light of this, a small body of literature has recently emerged to test the hypothesis that 
financialisation has negative effects on non-financial corporations' investments, estimating 
behavioural equations for investment (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b; 
van Treeck, 2008; Demir, 2009; Onaran et al., 2011; Seo et al., 2012; and Tori and Onaran, 
2015). 
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of financialisation on the real investment of 
Portuguese non-financial corporations between 1979 and 2013, and contributes to the literature 
mainly in three ways. First, it focuses on the behaviour of Portuguese non-financial 
corporations, whereas most studies focus on the USA or the UK. The Portuguese economy is 
considered to be less financialised than the USA or UK economies and its main agents of 
financialisation are banks as opposed to financial markets. To use the terminology of Orsi and 
Solari (2010) and Sawyer (2013), Portugal has a “bank-based” financial system in which banks 
are the economy's main financing agents. Second, the paper uses a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) to assess the relationship between financialisation and real investment, which 
allows a distinction to be made between the short-term and the long-term effects of 
financialisation. Finally, the model includes both financial receipts and payments of firms and 
uses aggregate macro data, which is not commonly found in the literature. 
In order to assess the macroeconomic relevance of financialisation, we estimate an 
equation that explains aggregate investment of non-financial corporations; it includes traditional 
variables (profitability, debt, cost of capital and output growth) and two proxies to capture the 
two channels of financialisation (financial receipts and financial payments of non-financial 
corporations).  
We identify a disruptive relationship between financialisation and real investment. The 
statistical evidence in favour of the financial payments channel is stronger than that of the 
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financial receipts channel. A disruptive relationship is also identified between profitability and 
real investment and between debt and real investment.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
the relationship between the financialisation and investment of non-financial corporations. An 
investment equation is presented in Section 3 before describing the data and the econometric 
methodology in Section 4. Section 5 provides the main results and discussion. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIALISATION AND REAL 
INVESTMENT 
 
Mainstream economics claims that financial institutions and financial markets play a 
crucial role in promoting the real investment of non-financial corporations. The financial sector 
and financial markets facilitate the provision of funding (by channelling savings to borrowers 
through credit and other forms), increase the efficiency in resources allocation by screening and 
monitoring investments, help to foresee the future economic outcomes and opportunities, reduce 
market imperfections, reduce transaction costs, and provide risk management services (Levine, 
2005). Several empirical studies find a positive association between financial development and 
economic growth (Levine, 2005; Ang, 2008; Arestis et al., 2015; among others).  
In contrast, the literature on financialisation argues that the growth of finance hampers 
real investment of non-financial corporations in two ways. Firstly, financialisation implies a rise 
in non-financial corporations' investment in financial assets and thus diverts internal funds from 
real investment. Secondly, there are strong pressures on non-financial corporations to increase 
payments, in the form of interest, dividends and stock buybacks, to financial markets and 
institutions. 
Regarding the first channel, Krippner (2005) shows that non-financial corporations have 
become more engaged in financial activities, as demonstrated by the growing importance of 
both financial revenues and profits in proportion of revenues and profits from productive 
activities, respectively. A number of explanations can be provided for this phenomenon. Firstly, 
firms become focused in current profitability and have shorter planning horizons (short-
termism) due to the pressure of shareholders (Crotty, 2005) and the link of managers bonuses to 
short-term profitability and stock price gains (Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2015). Consequently, 
managers favour financial investments that may yield higher and faster returns than investment 
in real assets, leading to the “crowding out” of real investment – the “management’s preference 
channel” according with Hein (2012) and Hein and Dodig (2015). 
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Secondly, firms have been engaging in financial activities to remain economically 
viable (or even increase their profitability) due to the decrease in profits from real activities and 
the increase in the cost of external funds since the 1980s (Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008a and 
2008b).  
Thirdly, the increase in financial investments tends to increase in periods of uncertainty 
(Baud and Durand, 2012), because firms favour them until uncertainty dissipates in order to 
mitigate risk (Soener, 2015). Indeed, Akkemik and Özen (2014) find that the rise in financial 
investments in Turkish firms is a response to higher macroeconomic uncertainty and risk.  
Finally, from the neo-institutionalism perspective of Soener (2015), there are two 
further reasons that may explain non-financial corporations' greater involvement in financial 
activities. The first is related to organisational learning whereby imitate competitors that engage 
in financial activities. The second explanation is associated with an institutional transmission of 
knowledge and practices between key actors (namely financial executives and independent 
consultants) and managers. The former actors have a strong know how of corporate finance and 
are able to persuade managers to engage more in financial activities.  
In contrast, some authors (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; and 
Ndikumana, 1999) claim that higher investment in financial assets could be positive for 
productive investments, especially if non-financial corporations use the returns from financial 
investments to finance real investments. This could be quite relevant for small corporations that 
face greater financial constraints (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). Nevertheless, the literature on 
financialisation generally excludes this hypothesis on the grounds that non-financial 
corporations usually re-invest financial profits in financial assets or distribute them as dividends 
to shareholders.  
The second channel through which financialisation depresses real investment is 
associated to the increase in payments to financial markets and institutions. These payments 
include both interest and dividends, which has experienced an upward trend in the last years due 
to the increase in the levels of indebtedness of non-financial firms (Orhangazi, 2008a and 
2008b). Lower retention ratios and higher interest payments reduce funds available for 
productive investments and hamper long-term investment projects, including research and 
development (Aglietta and Breton, 2001; Duménil and Lévy, 2004). This channel is referred to 
by Hein (2012) and Hein and Dodig (2015) as the “internal means of finance channel”, and is 
able to explain the “puzzle” of “profit without investment”, that is the downward trend in 
investment growth accompanied by an upward trend in profits (Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 
2014). This “puzzle”, which is explained by the increase in shareholder power, is confirmed for 
the USA, UK, France, Germany and Italy from the mid-1980s by Stockhammer (2005). 
A key element to understand the rise in financial payments by non-financial 
corporations over the last three decades is the emergence of a new design of corporate 
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governance that favours shareholder value, commonly referred to as a “shareholder value 
orientation” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Stockhammer, 2010). Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2000) state that the orientation has changed from one based on profit retention and 
reinvestment to one of downsizing the labour force and distributing profits to shareholders. In 
this context, Levy-Orlik (2012) admit that production decisions dominated by the maximisation 
of shareholder value seek to reduce production costs and increase share prices without regard 
for technological innovation or the industrial side of the business.   
The rise in shareholder value orientation in firms is fundamentally connected to the 
growing importance of institutional investors in financial markets, who seek constant 
appreciation in share prices and, thus, press corporations to practice high payout ratios 
(Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). A failure by non-financial corporations to realise the expected 
financial payments leads to institutional investors walking out, a fall in share prices and 
probably a takeover. 
Managers of non-financial corporations raise short-term payout ratios not only due to 
shareholder pressure, but also due to their personal interests. There is an incentive for managers 
to increase share prices in the short-term (notably by distributing a high level of dividends) 
because their remuneration schemes are based on the short-term evolution of those prices 
(Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b). 
Some authors (e.g. Orhangazi 2008a and 2008b) emphasise that the rise in financial 
payments could foster an increase in real investment because it signals that corporations have 
higher levels of profitability and solvency. This facilitates the access to funding at lower costs, 
which is important for the realisation of real investments. Kliman and Williams (2015) also 
conclude for the USA that the rise in both financial payments and purchases by firms has not 
pressed down productive investment, but this is because firms increased borrowing to support 
these financial operations. 
Despite the increasing amount of theoretical work on the effects of financialisation on 
investment, empirical studies are limited (Onaran et al., 2011). Nevertheless, a relatively small 
body of literature has emerged in recent years dedicated to assessing the impact of 
financialisation by estimating investment equations.  
Accordingly, Stockhammer (2004) estimates an investment equation for four countries 
(Germany, France, UK and USA), from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, using the rentier 
income of non-financial corporations (interest and dividend income, i.e. receipts from financial 
investments) as a proxy for financialisation. Other determinants of investment considered are 
capacity utilisation, profitability and the relative cost of capital. Partial Adjustment Models 
(PAM) and Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models are used in the estimations with 
annual data. He finds strong support for financialisation causing a slowdown of capital 
accumulation in the USA and France, some support in the UK and none in Germany. For the 
6	
	
UK, he recognises that financialisation has not been accompanied by a decline in accumulation 
because the investment rate was already very low in the Golden Age. In the case of Germany, 
the author argues that “shareholder value orientation” is a recent phenomenon.   
Rather than using financial revenues, van Treeck (2008) stresses the role of financial 
payments in explaining investment by non-financial corporations in the USA, from 1965 to 
2004. He uses an ARDL approach that requires fewer theoretical assumptions than the 
traditional cointegration techniques. The first interesting result is that, without taking into 
account financial payments of corporations, he obtains a positive but not robust relationship 
between profit rate and investment for the USA. In France and Germany, no long run 
relationship is found between profit rate and investment, whereas in the UK the relationship is 
weak. Most importantly, in a further analysis for the USA, it is established that interest and 
dividend payments significantly improve the empirical fit of the investment equation and have a 
negative impact on investment, whereas profit rate has a positive effect. This evidence explains 
why capital accumulation had a downward tendency in the USA despite an increase in the profit 
rate.   
For the US economy between 1960 and 2007, Onaran et al. (2011) focus on the 
differentiated effects on investment of the rentier and non-rentier profit shares for the overall 
economy (and not only for corporations). Using an Error Correction Model (ECM) and output 
as a control variable, results indicate the expected positive effect on investment of the non-
rentier profit share and a negative effect of the rentier profit share (dividends and interest). The 
latter impact results both from the reduction in available funds to invest and the effect of 
shareholder orientation on investment decisions.  
Orhangazi (2008a) studies the investment of non-financial corporations in the USA 
using not only aggregate data for non-financial corporations, but also firm level data to break 
the analysis down by sector (manufacturing versus non-manufacturing corporations), industry 
(durables versus non-durables producers) and dimension (small versus large corporations) – for 
a similar analysis with firm level data see also Orhangazi (2008b). In order to test the 
significance of the two channels of financialisation, he uses two proxies: financial profits (i.e. 
the income in the form of interest and dividends) and financial payments (interest and dividends 
payments and stock buybacks). In both studies, the control variables used by Orhangazi are real 
as well as financial determinants of investment, notably output (or sales), level of debt, and 
cash-flow (or internal funds). Orhangazi (2008a) uses the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimator with the variables in first differences (to ensure stationarity). He finds a negative 
effect of financialisation on investment, but the variable of financial profits lacks statistical 
significance. Orhangazi (2008b) uses the Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation technique. In relation to financial profits, he finds negative and statistically 
significant effects on investment for large firms across different sectors, but a positive and 
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significant effect for small firms. Regarding financial payments, he finds negative and 
statistically significant effects on investment in both for small and large firms from different 
industries. 
Tori and Onaran (2015) also use firm-level data but to study UK corporations. The 
authors assess the relationship between financialisation and investment for the listed non-
financial corporations between 1985 and 2013. The investment equation is estimated with the 
Arrelano-Bond GMM estimator and using financial incomes and financial payments as proxies 
of financialisation. Both variables exert a negative influence on investment, especially in the 
pre-crisis period and in the manufacturing sector. Financial incomes increase investment in the 
case of small and medium corporations, as in Orhangazi (2008b). 
Demir (2009) is a pioneer in studying the effect of financialisation on investment in 
emerging countries. He assesses how real investment of private industrial firms is affected by 
the differential between the rates of return of fixed investment and financial investment (herein 
return gap) in three emerging countries (Mexico, Argentina and Turkey) during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, a period of economic liberalisation. The author uses micro data and a GMM 
dynamic model for each country to conclude that the return gap is an important factor to explain 
investment in the three countries: an increase in the return of financial investment vis-à-vis fixed 
investment reduces the investment in fixed capital.  
Seo et al. (2012) focus on the impact of financialisation on investment in intangible 
assets, notably in research & development (R&D). They use data for Korean non-financial 
corporations from 1994 to 2009 and make use of three variables to capture the two 
aforementioned channels related with financialisation. On one hand, they use total investment in 
financial assets divided by total assets, and financial investment unrealised gains (i.e. unrealised 
gains on financial assets, namely on short-term financial instruments, trading securities, 
available-for-sale securities and other short and long-term securities) divided by total assets. On 
the other hand, they utilise the sum of dividend payments and stock buybacks divided by total 
assets. Firm size, return on assets, the debt ratio, cash-flow from operating activities, the 
ownership structure and a dummy variable for high-tech industries are included as control 
variables. The estimations for the entire sample and for the subperiods before and after the 
Asian financial crisis allow the conclusion that financialisation has a negative effect on R&D 
investment, particularly in the period after the crisis.  
In sum, there is already a range of studies on the impact of financialisation on real 
investment, with the following main differences: they analyse developed economies or 
emerging economies; the use of micro level data or aggregate data; the consideration of overall 
investment of non-financial corporations or only investment in R&D; and the use of financial 
revenues and/or financial payments. Despite the differences, most of these studies find 
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statistical evidence supporting the theoretical claim that financialisation has a negative impact 
on real investment of non-financial corporations. 
We contribute to the literature in the following three ways. Firstly, while the literature 
reviewed above focuses mostly on large and highly developed economies, we study a smaller, 
less developed and more peripheral economy, namely that of Portuguese. This is also relevant 
because the impact of financialisation varies from country to country, even in the more 
developed economies. For instance, Stockhammer (2004) suggests that financialisation may 
have no effect in a “bank-based” financial system, like Germany. The study of Portugal is also 
interesting because firms are becoming increasingly financialised, as suggested by the increase 
in financial revenues as a percentage of gross operating surplus (Lagoa et al., 2014). This 
occurred despite the fact financial markets are less relevant in Portugal, and many corporations 
are not quoted in the stock market. But even for unquoted corporations, financialisation affects 
real investment through the two abovementioned channels. Corporations' tendency to prefer 
financial investment rather than real investment is probably due to the decline in the 
profitability of real activities and the increased uncertainty from the macroeconomic 
environment and other sources (e.g. increasing competition from emerging economies). In turn, 
the increase in financial payments may be linked to a fall in corporations’ profitability, leading 
them to distribute more funds so that shareholders may obtain higher returns in the financial 
markets. In addition, more indebted corporations have to pay higher interest to banks and 
financial markets. Finally, even though many corporations are not quoted, they are owned by 
business groups led by quoted companies and so suffer indirectly from the same type of 
pressure from financial investors. Other shareholders of non-quoted corporations may also be 
influenced by an economic culture oriented to short-term financial gains and thus demand high 
dividends from corporations. Corporate shareholders tend to imitate competitor firms and 
follow the advice of financial executives and consultants who are of growing importance to 
corporate decision-making (Soener, 2015).  
Secondly, we contribute by measuring the impact of financialisation using two 
channels: financial receipts and financial payments of non-financial corporations. Only  
Orhangazi (2008a) has used this approach with aggregate macro data. 
Finally, the paper uses a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), which allows a 
distinction to be made between the short-term and the long-term effects of financialisation. We 
expect the long-run effects to be stronger due to the long-run nature of the phenomenon under 
study. We also analyse how investment reacts dynamically to the financialisation variables by 
using the Impulse Response Function. This allows us to trace the impact of financialisation on 
investment taking into account the reaction of other key variables (and not ceteris paribus), 
incorporating the long and short run relationships between variables, and identifying the time 
profile of the reaction (not only the contemporaneous or lagged effect). 
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3. FINANCIALISATION AND REAL INVESTMENT: 
AN ECONOMIC MODELISATION 
 
In what follows, we estimate an equation in which the investment of non-financial 
corporations depends on the control variables identified in the literature revised above: 
profitability, level of debt, cost of capital, and output growth. Following Orhangazi (2008a and 
2008b), we assume two measures of financialisation, financial receipts and financial payments 
of non-financial corporations, which assess the relevance of the two channels that are expected 
to hamper real investment, as described in the previous section. 
The long run investment function takes the following form: 
 
  (1) 
 
, where I  is investment of non-financial corporations, P  is profitability, D  is the corporate 
debt, CC  is the cost of capital, OG  is output growth, FR  are financial receipts, FP  are 
financial payments and th  represents an exogenous investment shock in period t , which is an 
independent and identically distributed (white noise) disturbance term with zero average and 
constant variance. 
All the variables pertaining to non-financial corporations (investment, profitability, 
debt, financial receipts and financial payments) are expressed as ratios of the respective gross 
value added. We adopted this approach rather than using the variables in volume, because it 
better expresses the relative importance of financialisation. 
It is worth noting that we estimate an aggregate investment function, similarly to 
Stockhammer (2004), Orhangazi (2008a), van Treeck (2008) and Onaran et al. (2011). Since the 
theory of the behaviour of non-financial corporations is microeconomic in nature and we wish 
to explain a macroeconomic phenomenon, implicitly we have to assume the existence of a 
representative corporation. However, the use of an aggregate investment function introduces 
some limitations on the analysis, notably it overlooks the possible heterogeneous behaviour of 
corporations by sector, industry, dimension or ownership; it permits the study of whether the 
phenomenon has a macroeconomic impact. But if we find an effect of the financialisation 
variables, we are unable to say whether this is due only to the impact of large corporations or 
whether it is a more generalised phenomenon across all corporations. If we do not find any 
macroeconomic effect of the financialisation variables, we cannot rule out that they affect a 
subset of corporations, which however is not enough to generate a macroeconomic effect.  
Turning now to the expected impact of the variables, profitability and output growth are 
likely to have a positive influence on investment; the cost of capital and the two variables of 
tt6t5t4t3t2t10t FPFROGCCDPI hbbbbbbb +++++++=
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financialisation are anticipated to have a negative effect, and the level of debt has an 
undetermined effect on investment. Therefore, the coefficients are expected to have the 
following signs: 
 
(2) 
 
 
Explaining now the reasons behind each beta sign, profitability could affect investment 
positively by determining the level of internal funds available for new investments 
(Stockhammer, 2004). Moreover, capital is attracted by the prospect of future profitability 
(Kopcke and Brauman, 2001), which given the uncertainty about the future, is largely formed 
on the basis of past performance, and thus past profitability is a major determinant of 
investment (Kuh and Meyer, 1955; and Minsky, 1975). 
 The level of debt may have a positive or negative impact on investment. On one hand, 
high levels of debt can be a symptom of financial fragility and thus limit new investment due to 
the difficulty in obtaining additional financing (both new debt and equity). If the debt level is 
perceived to be unsafe, the rise in debt has a negative effect on investment as future profits may 
be insufficient to repay debt, and this raises the possibility of bankruptcy. On the other hand, if 
the debt level is considered to be safe (by managers, banks and financial markets), the rise in 
debt may have no effect on investment, or it may even be positive as it means more available 
funds (Orhangazi, 2008a and 2008b) and an easing of credit constraints.   
From a neo-classical perspective, investment depends negatively on the cost of capital 
(traditionally measured by the level of real long-term interest rates) on the grounds that 
investment ultimately depends on the funding or opportunity costs. A higher interest rate may 
also increase the difficulty in obtaining external finance if financial markets are incomplete 
(Hein and Vogel, 2008), as credit rationing may be stronger. 
Output growth is also expected to be positively related with investment due to the 
Keynesian acceleration principle (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). This principle postulates that 
capital accumulation increases more than proportionally with the increase in economic activity. 
Indeed, it is widely recognised that most corporations are more willing to invest in periods of 
rapid growth than during downturns, justifying investment procyclicality.  
Finally, the rise in financial receipts may restrict real investment insofar as non-
financial corporations will probably use this income to make further investments in financial 
assets rather than investing in real activities (the “crowding out” effect). Moreover, the rise in 
financial payments also constrains real investment by non-financial corporations as it reduces 
the funds available for financing.   
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY: THE ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
 
 4.1. DATA 
 We collect annual data from 1979 to 2013 in order to analyse the relationship between 
financialisation and real investment in Portugal. Data on all variables are available for this 
period and frequency and are suitable for the study for two reasons. Financialisation became 
more preponderant in Portugal during the 1990s (Lagoa et al., 2013) and we therefore cover 
periods of both stable and increasing financialisation; and annual data is a suitable frequency to 
capture the determinants of investment that is a medium- to long-term decision. 
Turning now to the definition of variables, investment rate is measured by the gross 
fixed capital formation of non-financial corporations divided by the respective gross value 
added. Gross operating surplus1 of non-financial corporations divided by the respective gross 
value added (usually referred to as profit share) is a proxy of profitability. Financial receipts 
correspond to the sum of interest and dividends and similar payments2 received by non-financial 
corporations divided by the gross value added of those corporations. Financial payments 
correspond to the sum of corporations' interest payments and distributed income (including 
dividends) by non-financial corporations divided by their gross value added. 
Gross fixed capital formation, gross value added, gross operating surplus, financial 
receipts and financial payments of non-financial corporations were collected from the 
Portuguese National Accounts (at current prices and in millions of euros) of Instituto Nacional 
de Estatística.  
In order to measure the level of current debt, we use the stock of banking credit to non-
financial corporations, available at the Bank of Portugal, divided by the respective gross value 
added. The total level of debt of non-financial corporations is not available for the entire sample 
period.  
We use the real interest rate (deflated by the GDP deflator) from AMECO database to 
measure the cost of capital of non-financial corporations. The short-term real interest rate is 
used between 1977 and 1984 and the long-term real interest rate, which only became available 
in 19853, is used in the following years. We opt in favour of this strategy instead of using only 
																																								 																				
1 According to the Eurostat, “gross operating surplus can be defined in the context of national accounts as 
a balancing item in the generation of income account representing the excess amount of money generated 
by incorporated enterprises' operating activities after paying labour input costs. In other words, it is the 
capital available to financial and non-financial corporations which allows them to repay their creditors, to 
pay taxes and eventually to finance all or part of their investment”.	
2 Similar payments to capital owners include withdrawals from the income of quasi-corporations (amounts 
that entrepreneurs withdraw for their own use from the profits earned by the quasi-corporations belonging 
to them).	
3 According to the AMECO database, the real interest rates are obtained from the difference between the 
nominal interest rates and the inflation rate measured by the GDP deflator. The short-term interest rates 
correspond to the interest rates on 6-month deposits and the long-term interest rates correspond to the 
weighted average of public and private bonds over five years. 	
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the short-term real interest rate, because investment is a long-term decision and is therefore 
more affected by long-term interest rates.  
As usual, we use the annual growth rate of gross domestic product to describe the 
evolution of output growth. This variable was collected from the PORDATA database4 (at 
current prices and in millions of euros) and it was deflated using the GDP deflator (2006=100), 
also available on the same database.  
Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix contain the descriptive statistics of the data and 
present the correlation matrix between variables, respectively. As preliminary evidence on the 
hypotheses under study, note that financial receipts and financial payments are negatively 
related with investment. Additionally, it should be noted that the absolute values of all 
correlation coefficients are lower than 0.8, which is crucial to exclude the existence of severe 
multicollinearity between the variables (Studenmund, 2005). In addition, the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) of each variable is smaller than the traditional ceiling of 10 (Table A3 in the 
Appendix), which is further indication of the inexistence of multicollinearity (Kutner et al., 
2004).  
 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
 The previous papers studying the impact of financialisation on aggregate investment 
use PAM and the ARDL Models (Stockhammer, 2004), OLS (Orhangazi, 2008a), or ECM (van 
Treeck, 2008; and Onaran et al., 2011). In contrast, we use a Vector Autoregressive Model 
(VAR/VECM) methodology that assumes that all variables are endogenous, which is 
appropriate for the set of variables under study, and it enables to examine the dynamic reaction 
of all variables to shocks. If the variables are cointegrated, we can use a VECM to distinguish 
the short-term and long-term effects of financialisation.  
 Our methodology involves five stages. First, we carry out unit root tests applying the 
conventional augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) (ADF) test and the Phillips and Perron 
(1998) (PP) test. If all variables are integrated of order one, we use the Johansen (1991 and 
1995) test to ascertain whether they are cointegrated – the second stage.  
Thirdly, if variables are stationary in levels or integrated of order one but not 
cointegrated, we estimate the model using a VAR; but if variables are integrated of order one 
and cointegrated, we use a VECM5. A VAR model treats all variables as endogenous and 
function of the lagged values of all variables in the system.  Mathematically, a VAR model with 
k  variables can be represented by: 
 
																																								 																				
4Please see http://www.pordata.pt/.	
5 Note that if variables are non-stationary but not cointegrated, we should also use a VAR model with 
differentiated variables. 	
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(3) 
 
, where ty  is a k vector of variables, iA  is a matrix  of coefficients to be estimated, p  is the 
number of lags, µ  is a vector of k constants and tu  is a vector of k innovations that may be 
contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables ( tu  
is a white noise process). A VECM is a restricted VAR for cointegrated non-stationary 
variables, which can be written as 
 
(4) 
 
This model allows the dynamic relationship between variables to be modelled using their 
differences but imposes an adjustment to the long-term equilibrium. Here, P and G  are the 
matrices containing the long and short-term information, respectively, such that: 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
The long-term matrix P  can also be written as 'abP = , where a  measures the speed of 
adjustment of the variables towards the equilibrium and b  is the matrix of long-term 
coefficients or the cointegration matrix.  
Diagnostic tests are conducted in the fourth stage to assess the adequacy of our results, 
notably the autocorrelation LM test, the Ramsey’s RESET test, the normality test, the 
heteroscedasticity test and the stability test. We also perform the cumulative sum of recursive 
residuals (CUSUM) and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) 
tests to assess the existence of structural breaks.  
The final step is to analyse the different dimensions of the results of our model. More 
specifically, we run Granger (1969) causality tests (the fifth stage), which allow us to determine 
whether the current value of a certain variable can be predicted the past values of the other 
variables. As a complement to the causality analysis, we study the impulse response functions 
(IRFs) in order to determine the short and long-term effect in the endogenous variables of an 
isolated shock on one of them.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 The graphs of variables (Figure A1 to Figure A7in the Appendix) suggest that all 
variables are non-stationary in levels. Employing the ADF and the PP tests in levels and in first 
differences (Table 1)6, we conclude that all variables are integrated of order one except for the 
cost of capital that is stationary in levels according with the PP test, but is non-stationary by the 
ADF test7. However, we assume that the cost of capital has a unit root because the ADF test is 
more suitable for finite samples (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1999). 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The next step is to determine the optimal lag length of the unrestricted VAR in levels 
(Table 2). We assume a maximum lag of two because we have a small sample, the data is 
annual, and the VAR does not satisfy the stability condition for a larger number of lags as at 
least one root of the characteristic polynomial is outside the unit circle (Lütkepohl, 1991)8. The 
optimal lag number is two by the FPE and AIC criteria, which are preferable in small samples 
(sixty observations and below) – Liew, 2004.  
	 	
[Table 2 around here] 
  
Then, we apply the Johansen (1991 and 1995) methodology to determine the existence 
of cointegration between the variables. We perform the Johansen test for all five standard 
assumptions regarding the deterministic trend and make our decision based on information 
criteria (Table 3). The optimal deterministic trend specification depends on the information 
criteria used; this may be due to the small sample size. The SC criteria selects the deterministic 
component where level data have no deterministic trend and the cointegrating equation has 
intercept – the second model (we use a 1% significance level). This is also the most sensible 
result because there is no significant trend in the levels of some variables (Figure A1 to Figure 
A7 in the Appendix). Assuming the second model for the deterministic trend and one lag for the 
model in first differences, the Trace test and the Maximum Eigenvalue test indicate one 
cointegration equation (see also Table 4).   
 
[Table 3 around here] 
[Table 4 around here] 
																																								 																				
6 PP test’ results are available upon request. 	
7Unless otherwise stated, empirical results were obtained with Eviews software.	
8 Result available upon request. 	
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Hence, we estimate a VECM considering one cointegrating vector, the second model 
for the deterministic trend, and one lag. After, we analyse five diagnostic tests (Table 5). The 
model’s residuals are uncorrelated and homoscedastic, and there is no misspecification by the 
Ramsey’s RESET test. We do not reject the null hypothesis that the residuals are normally 
distributed using a significance level of 1%, but we reject it for higher significance levels. This 
is not considered very serious because the central limit theorem guarantees the normality of 
residuals as our sample has more than thirty observations. Moreover, Hendry and Juselius 
(2000) recognise that the normality assumption is seldom satisfied in economic applications, 
which does not invalidate the global robustness of models or the statistical inference.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
The model is stable because it has six eigenvalues equal to unity, one less than the 
number of variables (Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004)9.Finally, the plots of the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests (Figure A8 in the Appendix) indicate that the coefficients are stable over time 
and thus confirm the absence of structural breaks. In short, the estimated VECM is well 
specified.  
We choose investment as the dependent variable of the long-term equation given our 
interest in estimating an investment equation. The long-term relationship is shown in Table 6 
and the short-term model is presented in Table 8. Note that we include an exogenous dummy 
variable for the year 1984 ( 1984D ) in the latter model in order to capture the strong fall of the 
investment rate in 1984 due to the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
Portugal. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
All variables are statistically significant in the long-term equation, with the exception of 
financial receipts; nonetheless, they exert a negative impact on investment rate, confirming 
partially the claim of the literature on financialisation. Financial payments are also a negative 
determinant of investment in the long-term: a 1 pp increase in this variable decreases investment 
by around 0.5 pp.  
Turning now to the control variables, profitability negatively influences investment in 
the long-term: a 1 pp increase in profitability decreases investment by 0.8 pp. This confirms the 
“profit without investment” assumption described above. Debt has a small positive influence on 
investment: a 1 pp rise in this variable increases investment by around 0.08 pp.. This occurs 
																																								 																				
9Result available upon request. 	
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probably because debt permits corporations with limited equity and internal means of finance to 
undertake investment through credit. Also as expected, the cost of capital exerts a negative 
impact on real investment: a 1 pp increase in this cost reduces investment by about 0.4 pp.  
In contrast, output growth affects positively firms’ investment: a 1 pp increase in 
economic activity raises investment by around 1.3 pp, which shows that investors are more 
willing to invest when economic growth increases and confirms that investment is procyclical. 
This is also in line with the acceleration principle as the coefficient of output growth is larger 
than one.  
	
[Table 7 around here] 
	
Table 7 presents the estimates for the error correction terms, which measure the 
adjustment of variables to the long-term equilibrium. The most important finding is that the 
coefficient of investment is statistically significant at a 1% level (the variable is not weakly 
exogenous) and exhibits a negative value; it confirms that this variable contributes to the 
convergence to the long-term equilibrium and it is therefore reasonable to be the endogenous 
variable. The coefficient of investment indicates that 22.5% of the deviation from the long-term 
equilibrium in one period is automatically corrected in the next period. Moreover, the error 
correction terms of cost of capital and financial payments are also statistically significant, and 
their reaction to the long-term relationship helps correct a possible disequilibrium, given the 
negative values of their error correction terms. Furthermore, output growth and financial 
receipts also contribute to the correction of a disequilibrium in the long-term relationship, 
although their error correction terms are not statistically significant.  
	 There are only two variables which are statistically significant in explaining real 
investment in the short-term: lagged investment and profitability (Table 8). Lagged investment 
is a relevant determinant of the contemporaneous investment, which demonstrates the level of 
persistence and inertia of this macroeconomic variable. Profitability has a positive influence on 
investment in the short-term, contrary to the negative influence in the long-term. The dummy 
variable for the year 1984 is also statistically significant and negative, proving that other factors 
not controlled in the model contributed to the strong decline in the investment rate in this year 
(we suggest it was the IMF’s intervention in the country). The non-significance of the financial 
revenues and financial receipts in the short-term and its significance in the long-run indicates, as 
expected, that the effect of financialisation is stronger in the long-run. 
 Given, the error-correction nature of the model, financial payments affect the evolution 
of investment when there is a disequilibrium in the long-run relationship. For instance, 
whenever financial payments are too high for the level of investment in the economy, 
investment decreases.   
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[Table 8 around here] 
	
Still regarding the short-run dynamics, it is possible to conduct Granger causality tests 
to gauge how past changes in one variable (with all other variables constant) affect investment. 
In our model, the causality testis similar to the analysis of the short-run coefficients, because the 
model only has one lag. Therefore, we confirm that profitability is the only variable that causes 
investment (Table 9), while financial receipts almost cause investment. 
 
[Table 9 around here] 
 
Thus far we have made a ceteris paribus analysis, but now we study how an 
unanticipated shock in one variable affects investment dynamically, making use of the IRFs. 
These functions simulate how the economy will react in period t and in the future to a shock in 
one variable in t allowing all the variables to react (with the short-term and long-term relations 
operating).  
The ordering of variables (i.e. the choice of variables that react in the same year to 
shocks in other variables) could change the profile of the IRFs (Enders, 2003; and Lütkepohl 
and Krätzig, 2004). Therefore, we use the generalised IRFs proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998), which does not require the ordering of variables, and thus avoids 
ambiguity arising from the choice of a specific ordering.  
The results show that investment responds negatively to a shock in financial receipts, 
confirming the formulated hypothesis (Figure 1). This reveals that corporations do not use 
financial income to finance productive investment, but they probably re-invest it in financial 
activities.  
On the other hand, the response of investment to a shock in financial payments is 
negative and pronounced, thus reinforcing the argument that pressures for financial payments 
decrease investment. Therefore, both channels of financialisation have a disruptive dynamic 
effect on investment, but the negative effect of the channel of financial payments is more 
vigorous. Note that this conclusion is in line with the long-run equation, but it is contradictory 
to the Granger causality analysis. This inconsistency can be explained by the fact that Granger 
causality is only a partial analysis that looks at the short-run effect and with a ceteris paribus 
assumption, whereas the IRFs assume a more general approach that encompasses both the short 
and long run effects in a dynamic setting. 
The level of debt has a negative dynamic effect on investment. Although an increase in 
debt has, ceteris paribus, a positive long-run effect on investment as proved above, when the 
other variables change, that effect becomes negative. Indeed, a shock in debt produces a 
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negative dynamic effect on profitability and output growth10, thus leading to a decrease in 
investment. This effect is probably explained because indebtedness, which has grown from the 
1990s onwards, limits the capacity of non-financial corporations to obtain more credit and 
equity. In the same vein, this suggests that credit is being used to repay existing credits rather 
than to make real investments. The unanticipated changes in the remaining variables have the 
expected impacts on investment. 
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
We now move on to check robustness11. To begin with, it is worth noting that the results 
would not have changed considerably if, as proposed by the AIC criteria in the Johansen test, 
we had chosen the fourth model (the level data and the cointegration equations have linear 
trends) – Table 3. The results remain very similar in the long-term except for the variables debt 
and financial receipts. On the one hand, debt becomes negatively related with real investment, 
and, on the other hand, financial receipts become statistically significant, but maintain a 
negative influence on real investment. The short term results and the profile of the generalised 
IRFs are also quite similar.  
In addition, we now use the short-term real interest rate to measure the cost of capital, 
instead of using a combination of both the short-term and long-term real interest rate as above. 
However, the short-term real interest rate is stationary in levels (both by the ADF test and the 
PP test), which prevents the use of a VECM. As an alternative, we apply the ARDL model 
presented by Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001); this is 
appropriate when there is a mixture of variables that are integrated of order zero and one. 
Applying this methodology, we conclude that the variables are cointegrated and statistically 
significant in the long-term, except precisely the cost of capital. The level of profitability, 
financial receipts and financial payments continue to negatively influence the investment rate, 
while the level of debt and output growth continue to exert a positive influence. In the short-
term, there are only three statistically significant variables and with positive signs: lagged 
investment, level of debt and output growth. The error correction term of investment also 
maintains its negative sign and is statistically significant; this confirms the existence of 
convergence to the long-term equilibrium.  
One limitation of our paper is the small sample. Given the specificity of data needed, it 
is not uncommon for papers to use samples of a similar length (see for example van Treeck, 
2008). The Johansen cointegration test is an asymptotic likelihood ratio test, which in small 
samples is less reliable (see for example: Cheung and Lai, 1993; and Johansen, 2002). 
																																								 																				
10These IRF are available upon request. 	
11All these results are available upon request.	
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Therefore, our results should be read with caution. However, the fact we are able to reproduce 
them with the ARDL model, which has better behaviour in small samples (Pesaran, 1997), 
shows they are not strongly affected by our sample size. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
  
The aim of this paper was to analyse whether financialisation supported or disrupted the 
real investment of non-financial corporations in Portugal between 1979 and 2013, using 
aggregate macroeconomic annual data. As opposed to conventional economic theory, the 
literature on financialisation indicates two ways in which the growth of finance reduces real 
investment. On one hand, the increase in financial investments by non-financial corporations 
deviates funds from productive investment. On the other hand, the pressure exerted by financial 
markets on non-financial corporations to raise financial payments also decreases the available 
funds for financing real investments. In this context, we estimated an investment equation using 
two independent variables to reflect the two channels of financialisation (financial receipts and 
financial payments), in addition to the usual explanatory variables (profitability, debt, cost of 
capital, and output growth).  
Having found cointegration between the variables, we estimated a VECM that allows us 
to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects on investment. Then, we are able to 
identify that financial payments exert a negative impact on real investment in the long-term, 
whereas financial receipts do not have a statistical significant effect.  Investment also reacts to 
deviations from the long-term relationship that depend on the variables capturing 
financialisation. In the short-term, the lagged changes in financial receipts and financial 
payments do not seem to have a statistically significant effect on investment, indicating that 
their effect is felt most in the long-run. 
In addition, the profile of the IRFs (that combine the short and long-term responses) 
illustrates that financial receipts and financial payments have a negative impact on real 
investment, but this effect is more pronounced for the latter variable. Other important findings 
are related with the variables of profitability and debt. Profitability is negatively related with the 
real investment in the long-term, suggesting that the puzzle of “profit without investment” also 
occurred in Portugal. In turn, debt has a negative dynamic impact on investment, which may 
indicate that the indebtedness of non-financial corporations limits their ability to obtain more 
funding to support real investments in a context where new debts are used to repay existing 
ones.  
Our findings show that the negative effects of financialisation on real investment are not 
an exclusive phenomenon of the most developed and financialised economies, like the USA and 
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UK, but also occur in smaller, less developed, less financialised and more peripheral economies 
like Portugal. 
 Future research should analyse the statistical relevance of these two channels using 
corporation-level data in order to identify the heterogeneity in the behaviour of non-financial 
corporations by sector, industry and size, as in Orhangazi (2008b). An alternative line of 
research would be to investigate the determinants of financialisation, following the approach of 
Akkemik and Özen (2014) and Soener (2015. A further extension of this work would be to 
evaluate the impact of financialisation on the other components of aggregate demand, namely 
on consumption and external demand, as in Onaran et al. (2011).  
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Table 1 – P-values of the ADF unit root test 
Variable 
Level First Difference 
Intercept Trend and Intercept None Intercept 
Trend and 
Intercept None 
I 0.005 0.019 0.320* 0.003 0.019 0.000* 
P 0.180* 0.437 0.796 0.005 0.020 0.000* 
D 0.284* 0.454 0.438 0.094 0.193 0.009* 
CC 0.144* 0.280 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
OG 0.085 0.118* 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
FR 0.148 0.185* 0.606 0.001 0.007 0.000* 
FP 0.137* 0.215 0.345 0.002 0.008 0.000* 
Note: The lag lengths were selected automatically based on the AIC criteria and * indicates the 
exogenous variables included in the test according to the AIC criteria 
 
 
Table 2 – Values of the information criteria by lag 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 n.a.  1.6e-20 -25.7 -25.4 -25.6 
1 290.9 3.0e-24 -34.4 -31.8* -33.5 
2 74.9* 1.4e-24* -35.6* -30.8 -34.0* 
Note: * indicates the optimal lag order selected by the respective criteria 
 
 
Table 3 – Number of cointegration relations by type of model specification (at 1% significance level) 
Data trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
(Test Type) (No intercept No trend) 
(Intercept 
No trend) 
(Intercept 
No trend) 
(Intercept 
Trend) 
(Intercept 
Trend) 
Trace test 1 1 1 2 3 
Maximum Eigenvalue test 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: We use only one lag to run this test, because the test is done using the first differences of the 
variables 
 
 
Table 4 – The Johansen cointegration test 
Cointegration relations Eigenvalue Trace statistic Maximum Eigenvalue statistic 
None 0.830 170.604*** 58.399*** 
At most 1 0.714 112.205** 41.261** 
At most 2 0.542 70.944 25.773 
At most 3 0.456 45.171 20.075 
Note: *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
 
 
Table 5 – Diagnostic tests for VECM estimations  
Test F-statistic P-value 
Autocorrelation test (up to one lag) 45.960 0.597 
Ramsey’s RESET test 0.006 0.940 
Normality test (Jarque-Bera) 26.517 0.022 
Heteroscedasticity test 1.846 0.184 
Stability (AR root) test Six eigenvalues 
Note: The Ramsey’s RESET test and the heteroscedasticity test were performed in Microfit software 
 
 
Table 6 – The long-term estimations of investment 
Variable Pt Dt CCt OGt FRt FPt β0 
It 
-0.823*** 
(0.161) 
[5.112] 
0.076*** 
(0.010) 
[-7.646] 
-0.363** 
(0.173) 
[2.095] 
1.320*** 
(0.168) 
[-7.838] 
-0.110 
(0.173) 
[0.637] 
-0.519*** 
(0.064) 
[8.086] 
0.571*** 
(0.066) 
[-8.674] 
Sample: 1981-2013 (33 observations) 
Note: Standard errors in ( ), t-statistics in [], *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level, *** indicates 
statistical significance at 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
 Table 7 – Error correction term estimations 
Variable ∆It ∆Pt ∆Dt ∆CCt ∆OGt ∆FRt ∆FPt 
Error 
Correction 
Term 
[t-statistic] 
-0.225*** 
(0.070) 
[-3.236] 
0.166 
(0.126) 
[1.320] 
-0.463 
(0.318) 
[-1.457] 
-0.434** 
(0.187) 
[-2.318] 
0.144 
(0.133) 
[1.080] 
-0.129 
(0.084) 
[-1.537] 
-0.761*** 
(0.219) 
[-3.483] 
Test Weak 
Exogeneity 
Chi-Square  
[p-value] 
10.659 
[0.001] 
1.819 
[0.177] 
2.287 
[0.130] 
5.972 
[0.015] 
1.379 
[0.240] 
2.654 
[0.103] 
10.344 
[0.001] 
Note: ∆ is the operator of the first differences, standard errors in ( ), t-statistics or p-value in [], *** 
indicate statistical significance at 1% level and ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level 
 
Table 8 – The short-term dynamic 
Variable ∆It-1 ∆Pt-1 ∆Dt-1 ∆CCt-1 ∆OGt-1	 ∆FRt-1	 ∆FPt-1 D1984 
∆It 
0.431*** 
(0.085) 
[5.080] 
0.701*** 
(0.141) 
[4.983] 
0.003 
(0.027) 
[0.123] 
-0.015 
(0.075) 
[-0.200] 
0.091 
(0.106) 
[0.861] 
0.225 
(0.172) 
[1.312] 
0.017 
(0.069) 
[0.249] 
-0.089*** 
(0.011) 
[-7.942] 
Sample: 1981-2013 (33 obs.);  R2 = 0.870; 2adjustedR  = 0.827; F-statistic = 20.095; Log Likelihood = 110.386 
Note: ∆ is the operator of the first differences, standard errors in ( ), t-statistics in [] and *** indicates 
statistical significance at 1% level 
 
Table 9 – Granger causality tests 
Null hypothesis Chi-square P-value 
∆Pt  → ∆It 24.819 0.000 
∆Dt → ∆It 0.015 0.902 
∆CCt → ∆It 0.040 0.842 
∆OGt → ∆It 0.741 0.389 
∆FRt → ∆It 1.720 0.190 
∆FPt → ∆It 0.062 0.804 
Note: The sign “→” means that the variable on the left of the sign does not Granger cause the variable on 
the right, and ∆ is the operator of the first differences 
 
Figure 1 – Generalised impulse response functions (accumulated response to one s.d. innovations) 
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Table A1 – Descriptive statistics of the data 
 I P D CC OG FR FP 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Mean 0.256 0.358 1.199 0.023 0.023 0.065 0.245 
Median 0.259 0.373 1.337 0.023 0.022 0.057 0.232 
Maximum 0.311 0.405 1.757 0.109 0.079 0.121 0.465 
Minimum 0.189 0.236 0.696 -0.062 -0.032 0.033 0.154 
Standard Deviation 0.036 0.044 0.356 0.035 0.028 0.023 0.081 
Skewness -0.245 -1.359 -0.184 0.045 0.108 0.839 1.186 
Kurtosis 1.778 3.765 1.461 3.731 2.552 3.029 3.838 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 – The correlation matrix between variables 
 I P D CC OG FR FP 
I 1       
P -0.284* 1      
D 0.165 -0.500*** 1     
CC -0.568*** 0.546*** -0.192 1    
OG 0.440*** 0.087 -0.563*** -0.262 1   
FR -0.330* 0.299* 0.195 0.521*** -0.440*** 1  
FP -0.058 -0.762*** 0.446*** -0.235 -0.297* -0.054 1 
Note: *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level, ** indicates statistical significance at 5% level and 
* indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
Table A3 – The diagnostic for multicollinearity 
Dependent Variable 2
adjustedR  Tolerance Value VIF 
I 0.464 0.536 1.866 
P 0.720 0.280 3.571 
D 0.564 0.436 2.294 
CC 0.464 0.536 1.866 
OG 0.556 0.444 2.252 
FR 0.300 0.700 1.429 
FP 0.611 0.389 2.571 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 – The plot of investment (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A2 – The plot of profitability (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A3 – The plot of debt (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A4  – The plot of cost of capital (%) 
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
INTRATE
 
 Figure A5 – The plot of output growth (annual growth rate) 
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Figure A6 – The plot of financial receipts (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A7 – The plot of financial payments (% of gross value added) 
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Figure A8 – CUSUM and CUSUMQ tests	
The plot of cumulative sum of recursive residuals	 The plot of cumulative sum of squares of recursive 
residuals 
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Note: The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level and were obtained in 
Microfit software	
	
	
